Page:NTSB Southern Airways Flight 932 report.pdf/25

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2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

2.1 Analysis

The aircraft center of gravity was within allowable limits. Based on the aircraft performance capability, there was sufficient runway available for N97S to have landed under the conditions existing at Huntington at the time of the accident.

The crew was properly certified and qualified for the flight. The aircraft had been maintained in accordance with existing company procedures and the Federal Aviation Regulations. The investigation disclosed no malfunction or failure in the aircraft structure, primary flight controls, or powerplants.

The Board review the charter arrangements, operations specifications, and regulations governing the dispatch and conduct of this flight. Although the flight was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedures, there is one area which is of concern to the Board. An equivalent level of safety for "off route" operations, of the type involved in this accident, is theoretically achieved by the increased landing minima applicable to such operations. However, the crew requirements for "off route" airport qualification do not require the same degree of qualification as required for scheduled operations. The reason for this is that it would not be practical to require an actual entry into every possible "off route" airport, nor would it be practical to have on hand the approved pictorial display for every possible "off route" airport. Nevertheless, the Board believes that a more positive means for determining that a pilot is qualified to make an initial entry into an "off route" airport should be established by the FAA and the air carriers. The company's operations manual provides that all a pilot is required to do for qualification is to sign a flight release form indicating that he has studied and knows the items enumerated in FAR 121.445. By comparison, FAR 121.443, which applies to scheduled operations, requires that the pilot-in-command, before making his initial entry into an airport under IFR conditions, must demonstrate that he has adequate knowledge, by actual entry into that entry, by entry into a nearby airport, by synthetic trainer, or by use of approved pictorial displays.

There is no evidence in this case to indicate that the crew had not sufficiently familiarized itself with the Huntington airport, surrounding terrain, and the approach and landing procedure. At the same time, there is no way to assure that the crew had actual knowledge of the foregoing prior

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