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Mass.]
NASH v. LATHROP.
6 N.E.
559

The purchase was at a rate of interest not shown to be excessive. The amount of the capital stock of the bank is not stated. It appears that it was a national bank, organized under the laws of the United States, and doing business in Boston. It was subject to the supervision of the government officers, and to the various regulations provided in the statutes for such institutions. Its stock then sold at par in the market; and occasionally, at about that time, at a small premium. It has always hitherto been considered in Massachusetts that investments of trust funds might properly be made in the shares of banks incorporated under the authority of this commonwealth or of the United States. Looking, as we must, simply at the circumstances of the case which are submitted to us, a majority of the court do not think the trustee ought to be held responsible for the loss on the purchase of the certificate.

4. The various matters of evidence which were objected to were competent. Decree accordingly.


(142 Mass. 29)

Nash, Petitioner for Mandamus, v. Lathrop.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. May 11, 1886.)

1. Judicial Decisions—Opinions of Justices—Rights of the Public.

The public has the right of free access to the opinions of the Justices of the supreme judicial court after they are delivered to the reporter of decisions.

2. Same—Contract—St. 1879, Ch. 280, Construed.

St. 1879, c. 280, and the contract made in pursuance of it, do not confer upon Little, Brown & Co., the exclusive right of first publication of the opinions of the justices, and do not authorize the reporter to refuse to the public the right to examine and procure copies of the opinions.

3. Same—Scope of Decisions—Statutes.

The decisions and opinions of the justices are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, which are binding upon all the citizens. They declare the unwritten law, and construe and declare the meaning of the statutes. Every citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared, and justice requires that all should have free access to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the decisions and opinions of the justices. Such opinions stand, upon principle, on substantially the same footing as the statutes enacted by the legislature.

4. Same—Policy of the State.

The policy of the state has been that the opinions of the justices, after they are delivered, belong to the public.

The facts appear in the opinion.

R. R. Bishop, Augustus Russ, A. M. Howe, and Geo. T. Lincoln, for petitioner.

W. G. Russell and G. Putnam, for respondents.

Morton, C. J. This is a petition for a mandamus to compel the reporter of decisions to allow the petitioner, who is the publisher of the Daily Law Record, a daily paper devoted to legal intelligence, to examine and take copies of the opinions and decisions of the justices of this court, which are in the regular custody of the reporter. The answer sets up that, by virtue of St. 1879, c. 280, and of a contract made in pursuance thereof, Little, Brown & Co. have the exclusive right of pub-