6 N.E.
lature expected that the immemorial custom of furnishing copies to the public would be continued. The construction claimed by the respondent is in derogation of the right of the public, and ought not to be adopted unless such was clearly the intention of the legislature. It was its intention, without doubt, that Little, Brown & Co. should have the exclusive right of publishing the authorized series of Massachusetts Reports, but we cannot see in the statute any intention to give to that firm the right to suppress and keep from the public the opinions of the justices until they should print them in the Reports. We are therefore of opinion that the claim of the respondent cannot be sustained.
Similar questions have arisen in several cases in other jurisdictions. While such cases have not the weight of authorities, because each case depends in some measure upon the statute of the state in which it arose, differing from our statute, yet the general current of the cases supports the principles upon which our decision rests. Banks v. Manchester, 23 Fed. Rep. 145; Myers v. Callaghan, 20 Fed. Rep. 441; Chase v. Sanborn, 4 Cliff. 306; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatchf. 165; Banks v. West Pub. Co. (U. S. Cir. Ct. Minn.) 27 Fed. Rep. 50.
In order to prevent misconstruction, we desire to add that, while it is the duty of the reporter to allow the public free access to the opinions in his custody, he has the right to make such reasonable regulations, as to the method of examining and obtaining copies of them, as he may deem necessary to secure the safety of his papers, and the orderly administration of the affairs of his office.
Mandamus to issue.
See, also, Davidson v. Wheelock, (U. S. Cir. Ct. Minn.) 27 Fed. Rep. 61.
Buttrick v. Tilton.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Essex. February 17, 1886.)
1. Entry, Writ of—Declaration—Sufficiency of Allegations.
In a writ of entry the allegation of the demandants, in their declaration, that they were seized “in their demesne as of fee,” is a sufficient allegation that they were seized in fee-simple.
2. Deeds—Delivery—Presumption of.
When a deed is regularly executed, and is found in the hands of the grantee, the presumption is that it has been duly delivered.[1]
3. Same—Description of Land Conveyed.
Where deeds conveyed “a certain right of land lying in the town formerly called B.,” and “also all the right we have in any estate, real or personal, belonging to the estate of J. A., late of H., deceased,” held, that they conveyed all the right which the grantors, who executed them, had in the real estate in H. which belonged to J. A.
4. Entry, Writ of—Proof by Demandant—Recovery, Extent of.
In a writ of entry the demandant must recover upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of that of the tenant. Not merely the possession, but the title, is in issue, and he can recover only to the extent to which he proves title.
- ↑ See note at end of case.
