Page:New York v. New Jersey (2023).pdf/7

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Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
5

Opinion of the Court

569 U. S., at 628; see also Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U. S. 330, 359 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U. S. 124, 128–129 (1987); Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 92 (1823). To that end, the Court has looked to “background principles of contract law” to interpret compacts that are silent on a particular issue. Mississippi v. Tennessee, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 10); see Tarrant, 569 U. S., at 628, 633.

To be sure, background rules of contract interpretation may not override a compact’s terms. Alabama, 560 U. S., at 351–352. This Court has said that a compact “is not just a contract,” but also “a federal statute enacted by Congress” that preempts contrary state law. Id., at 351; see Tarrant, 569 U. S., at 627, n. 8. But when the compact does not speak to a disputed issue, background contract-law principles have informed the Court’s analysis.

Under the default contract-law rule at the time of the Compact’s 1953 formation, as well as today, a contract (like this Compact) that contemplates “continuing performance for an indefinite time is to be interpreted as stipulating only for performance terminable at the will of either party.” 1 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §4:23, p. 570 (4th ed. 2022); see also, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §33, Comment d, p. 94 (1979); 1 S. Williston, Law of Contracts §38, p. 59 (1920); Compania Embotelladora Del Pacifico, S. A. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 976 F. 3d 239, 245 (CA2 2020); In re Miller’s Estate, 90 N. J. 210, 219, 447 A. 2d 549, 554 (1982); Zimco Restaurants, Inc. v. Bartenders and Culinary Workers Union, Local 340, 165 Cal. App. 2d 235, 240 (1958); Fulghum v. Selma, 238 N. C. 100, 103–104, 76 S. E. 2d 368, 370–371 (1953); Bailey v. S. S. Stafford, Inc., 178 App. Div. 811, 815, 166 N. Y. S. 79, 82 (1917). Parties to a contract that calls for ongoing and indefinite performance generally need not continue performance after the contractual relationship has soured, or when the circumstances that