unselfish, industrious"—such is another list of the qualities and impulses that tend to be praised; all not on their own account, but as means to the group's ends, as necessary for its preservation and advancement[1] One might call them essential morality—as distinguished from the morality that varies from one people to another; Nietzsche does not use the phrase, but his view seems to warrant it. Everywhere there is a tendency toward the exaltation of virtues of this description, i.e., within each group and as conditions of the group's life.
Morality thus comes to be seen in a certain perspective, and we understand the gravity which has always been attached to it. As a condition of life for the group,[2] it is supremely important; if it is not respected, the group structure becomes loose, the group itself is liable to be dissolved. From the latter's most intimate instincts of self-preservation come affirmation and negation, approval and disapproval, praise and blame accordingly. The group may of course err in making particular judgments—may regard things as necessary to its well-being which are not, may treat individuals as responsible when they are not, but judge as best it can it must. If it will live, it must value, i.e., look at things in relation to itself and its needs, and pronounce accordingly; it must have tables of good and evil, must love and hate, praise and blame, reward and punish.[3] The good is good for it, the evil evil for it—it is indeed the first creator of good and evil, individual estimates coming later.[4]
At the same time good, being good for the group, is not a good over it. It makes categories of good and evil which bind its members, but in the nature of the case they do not apply to itself. Morality has its meaning as the conduct that serves it, but the group is not in the relation of service to something beyond itself; nor as creator of good and evil is it subject
- ↑ Will to Power, § 284.
- ↑ The expression "life-conditions," or its equivalent, appears repeatedly; cf. Will to Power, §§ 204, 216, 256; Werke, XIII, 139, §§ 320-3; XIV, 67, § 132; 338, § 188.
- ↑ Zarathustra, I, xv; Werke, XIII, 197, § 435; Will to Power, §§ 216, 293.
- ↑ Zarathustra, I, xv. Dewey and Tufts speak of man as "an active and organizing judge and creator of values" (op. cit., p. 184), but appear to have in mind individuals rather than groups.
