Page:Nietzsche the thinker.djvu/284

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268
NIETZSCHE THE THINKER

tract their more ultimate basis is certain relations of power. The creditor has a surplus, can part with something—he has more power; but the debtor also has a certain amount of power—he can make a return, apart from which he is no better than a beggar, something which makes Nietzsche say once in a general way that it is our pride that commands the doing of our duty.[1] In other words, powerless inactive entities with nothing to confer acquire no rights, and incapacitated people cannot rise to the dignity of duties. Rights and duties in concrete cases are a fine equation of powers—as power-quantities change, they do too. If our power materially diminishes, the feeling of those who have hitherto guaranteed our right changes, also; they see whether they can bring us again to full possession of our power—if it is impossible, they deny henceforth our "rights." Just so, when our power increases considerably, the feeling of those, who have hitherto recognized it and whose recognition we now no longer need, changes—they may try to hold us down to our former measure, they may be ready to interfere and appeal to their "duty" in this connection—but it is only useless talk. The history of peoples shows this waxing and waning of rights on a large scale.[2] Indeed, Nietzsche goes so far in this direction that he may seem to abandon his view of the contractual origin of rights altogether. For instance, Zarathustra says to his disciples, "a right which thou canst seize, thou shalt not allow to be given thee."[3] The idea of forcible conquest is carried into the innermost regions of one's personality. Whoever, we bear, has finally conquered himself [not then simply contracted with himself] regards it as his right to punish himself, to pardon himself, to pity himself—it is a right he does not need to concede to any one else, though he may of his free will give it to another (for instance, a friend), knowing that only "those can give rights who are in possession of power."[4] Of similar tenor is the statement, "we do not believe in a right that does not rest on the power to put itself through: we feel all rights to be conquests";[5] also

  1. Dawn of Day, § 112.
  2. Ibid., § 112; cf. The Wanderer etc., § 26.
  3. Zarathustra, III, xii, § 4.
  4. Dawn of Day, § 437.
  5. Will to Power, § 120.