That primitive form of social relation which we have already considered—bargaining or contracting—has for its presupposition a certain equality between the parties concerned. If there is decided difference in strength, one side is apt simply to take from the other. But where there is approximate equality, and struggle would only lead to reciprocal harm, a disposition naturally arises to come to an understanding, to treat or negotiate, the outcome being an exchange, in which each gets what under the circumstances he values most (a suum cuique in the material sense).[1] This is the earliest form of justice, which is at bottom the good will to come to an agreement, to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement, something like what the Germans call, particularly in its finer expressions, "Billigkeit," the spirit of reasonableness and fairness.[2] An exchange is just and honorable, when each party asks what he thinks his article is worth, taking into account the difficulty of procuring it, its rarity, the time spent in getting it, etc., along with the fancy value; if he fixes his price with an eye on the needs of the other, he is a refined robber and extortioner.[3] That is, if there is to be exchange, not robbery, the spirit of exchange must be there—and it is with this in mind that Nietzsche makes the remark, already quoted, regarding the circumstances of today, that justice must become greater in all and the violent instinct weaker.[4] Justice may even extend to the relations of the stronger to the weaker to a certain extent. Suppose, for example, that a beleaguered town finds itself forced to surrender. It is plainly the weaker party, but for all that it has something on its side, something that it would be of use for the conqueror to obtain. The inhabitants might burn the town and make way with themselves—then the conqueror would have little for his pains. There is then a certain advantage for both sides in not going to extremes—and on this basis of mutual advantage they may treat—each getting what under the actual circumstances he values most. In the same way there may be rights between masters and slaves—that is, to the extent the possession of the
