their one moment of strength in a crime and that this may be a justification of their existence; also, that the really great in history have been criminals, breaking, as they had need, with custom, conscience, duty—knowing the danger of it, yet willing the great end and therefore the means (cf. also Werke, XIV, 78, § 153). As to the first point (cf. also Werke, XI, 250, §216), the view is not unlike Browning's in "The Statue and the Bust":
"I hear your approach—'But delay was beat
For their end was a crime.'—Oh, a crime will do
As well, I reply, to serve for a test.
As a virtue golden through and through."
(Cf. also Nietzsche's reference to Dostoiewsky's testimony as to the strong characters he met with in prison, Will to Power, § 233). In judging the second point, it may not be beside the mark to say that "crime" is a legal category, that "conscience" is a psychological phenomenon not necessarily squaring with the truth of things, that "duty" means felt duty, which may not be what one really ought to do (supposing that there is any objective standard)—does not the Talmud say that there is "a time to serve the Lord by breaking his commandments?" Beyond Good and Evil, § 158, "To our strongest impulse, the tyrant within us, not only our reason subjects itself, but also our conscience; " also Werke, XIII, p. 209, § 482, "No one is held in check by principles." These are primarily statements of fact, and the truth of them is a question for psychologists. It may be said, however, that the last statement cannot possibly mean that man's thoughts, his general principles, may not influence his conduct, Nietzsche giving too many instances of a contrary view (cf. Werke, XII, 64, § 117, quoted ante, p. 175). What perhaps, Nietzsche really had in mind was that "principles," taken abstractly and out of relation to the psychological driving forces, are ineffectual—somewhat as Fichte said, "Man can only will what he loves," or as J. R. Seeley spoke of the expulsive power of a new affection. Will to Power, § 788, "to give back to the bösen man good conscience—has this been my involuntary concern? and indeed to the bösen man, so far as he is the strong man"? This is perhaps the most shocking passage to the ordinary reader, but hardly to one acquainted with Nietzsche's thought and use of language. The böse man is one who is bent on injury or destruction and inspires fear; such men are necessary to the world's progress, in Nietzsche's estimation—both malevolent and benevolent impulses having their part to play. Nietzsche has no wish to give good conscience to the bad (schlechten) man.
CHAPTER XXVI
a The problem is, of course, highly accentuated for Christianity, since to it Almighty Power has made man, and might apparently have given equal energy to all.
b This does not mean that historical conditions determine them, but simply make them possible. Against the former view Nietzsche strongly protests—see ante, p. 355, and Nietzsche's Werke, XII, 189-3, § 412; XIV, 215-6; Twilight etc., ix, § 44. According to Wilhelm Ostwald, many more potential great men are born than actually become so (Grosse Männer, p. iii) .
c Cf. D. G. Mason's remarks about Beethoven: "He was wilful; but it was the wilfulness of a man who knew that he had a great work to do and that he understood how to do it better than any one else" (A B C
