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whatever. The acts of an assessor are certainly of the first importance to the tax-payer; and his acts, while acting as such assessor, are judicial in their character. 1 Desty, Tax’n, 493, 542; Cooley, Tax’n, 551, and cases cited. The tax-payer is entitled to the best judgment of the assessor in fixing the value of his property. Snell v. Fort Dodge, 45 Iowa, 566. And an assessment can only be made by the officer designated by law to make it. Welty, Assessm. § 10, and cases cited. We cannot regard Ferguson as an officer de facto, because he was acting under color of no office. There could be no such office: as deputy assessor de facto, because there existed no such office de jure. 1 Desty, Tax’n, 508, 509; Bailey v. Fisher, 38 Iowa, 229; Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1121. It follows that Ferguson was without authority to make an assessment, and any tax based upon such an assessment was necessarily illegal and void. There existed, then, a valid tax against respondent’s property of 14.4 mills, and a claim of a further tax of 7 mills, which was invalid. The county clerk had delivered to the treasurer no duplicate list, as provided by law. The city authorities had failed to certify to the county treasurer a list of delinquent city taxes as provided by law. Said county treasurer, under a notice not properly describing respondent’s property, and entirely omitting some portions of it, proceeded to sell said property, and issued certificates of sale, including in one certificate both taxes. This action is brought to cancel such certificates. On the other hand, respondent’s lands were not exempt from taxation. The officers who imposed the county tax were fully authorized so todo. The levy is within the limit fixed by law. There is no claim that any officer or board has in any manner acted fraudulently in connection with these tax proceedings. Respondent has never paid, or offered to pay, any taxes whatever on his property for the year 1885. There is no support whatever in the evidence for the claim that these taxes were unjust or inequitable, and there is no such finding. Counsel for appellant urges that, under this state of facts, respondent has no standing in a court of equity—F rst, because he has not brought himself within the rules prescribed by courts of equity upon which they will in any case interfere with tax proceeding