is announced in Nebraska. Lininger v. Raymond, 9 Neb. 40, 2 N. W. Rep. 359.
Applying the principles of the cases last referred to—as we should do in a proper case—it would not follow that a debtor who, in making a voluntary assignment for the benefit of his creditors without fraud, reserved property as exempt to which he was not entitled, would thereby defeat and invalidate the assignment. In the Nebraska case the court say: “Under the statute the entire proceedings are under the supervision and control of the district court, or the judge thereof, and it is the duty of the court or judge, upon proper application to see that the assignee properly discharges the duties of his trust.” This language can be adopted by us, and will be equally appropriate when used in the case at bar. Section 4675, Comp. Laws, declares that “all proceedings under this title shall be subject to the order and supervision of the judge of the district court of the county in which such assignment was made.” The statute devolves upon the judge of the district court duties and powers which can only be put forth by a court of chancery, and hence the statute would be construed to mean the district court, as well as the judge thereof, whenever such construction became necessary to administer a trust, and carry out the objects of the statute. Under the statute, and in virtue of the inherent powers of the district court as a court of equity, that tribunal would readily find all proper and necessary machinery requisite to administer the trust created by an assignment for the benefit of creditors. It could readily find the means and agencies necessary to protect the interests of creditors, and also those of the debtor. If it should appear in any case that a debtor had not turned over to his assignee “all property not exempt from execution,” the court, on proper application therefor, would, under the authorities, find appropriate means of reaching such property if within the jurisdiction of the court. And if it became necessary to do so, a court of equity would devise the means and agencies necessary to separate, identify, and turn over to the debtor any exemptions which a debtor might elect to reserve, not exceeding. in amount his legal exemptions. In Brooks v. Nichols, 17 Mich. 38, the court
