Radley v. Kuhn, 97 N. Y. 26; Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. 71; Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 102; Shipman v. Rollins, 98 N. Y. 311; Knox v. Jones, 47 N. Y. 390; De Wolf v. Lawson, (Wis.) 21 N. W. Rep. 615; Simpson v. Cook, 24 Minn. 180-184. It is not merely future estates which are void. Every estate, present or future, which suspends the absolute power of alienation, is void. Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61-163; Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265-305.
But it is insisted that all the real estate owned by the testator at the time of his death was, by the will, equitably converted into personalty; that, under § 3364 of the Compiled Laws, it is therefore to be deemed personalty from the death of the testator, and that a will of personal property is to be governed as to the validity of the trust it creates, by the law of the testator’s domicile, under § 3397 of the Compiled Laws; and that by the laws of that domicile (Pennsylvania) the trust is valid. Section 3364 declares that “when a will directs the conversion of real property into money, such property and all its proceeds must be deemed personal property from the time of the testator’s death.” Section 3397 provides that the validity and interpretation of a will relating to personal property, is to be governed by the laws of the testator’s domicile. These statutes are merely declaratory of long-established rules. It is conceded that the will, if it is a will of real property—is to be governed by the laws of this state, as to the validity of the trust, so far as that trust affects land within the state. Section 3397 expressly declares this rule. If then the will equitably converts into personalty all the testator’s real estate within this jurisdiction, it is to be governed by the laws of Pennsylvania. If it is so governed, the trust is valid. The same rule as to perpetuities applies to personal property, as to real estate, in the absence of a statute. The absolute ownership of personal property may, at common law, be suspended for the same period as real estate. Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 421; 1 Jarm. Wills, 519. Jarman says: “To the test of the rule settled by Cadell v. Palmer, every gift of real or personal estate, by will or otherwise, must be brought.” In Waldo v. Cummings the court, after referring to authorities, say: “These authorities leave no doubt that chat-
