Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 1).pdf/270

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NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS.

In School District v. Kemen, (Wis.) 32 N. W. Rep. 42, the court say: "If the appeal be regarded as from an order for judgment, instead of a judgment, (which seems to be the view taken of it by counsel for the plaintiff,) it must still be dismissed. A mere order for judgment is not appealable." In Treat v. Hiles, (Wis.) 44 N. W. Rep. 1088, the court say: "For the same reason, the rule is applicable to an order denying a motion for judgment on a verdict. Such an order does not prevent a judgment for the other party, from which the moving party may appeal, or an order for a new trial, from which he may also appeal. Indeed, the result of a verdict necessarily is a judgment of some sort for one party or the other, or a new trial; and on an appeal by the aggrieved party, whether from the judgment or the order for a new trial, the court will determine whether such party is entitled to judgment on the verdict. Neither does an order denying a motion for judgment on the verdict involve the merits of the action, within the meaning of subdivision 4 of the same section. It is practically a ruling by the court on the trial, with the same incidents which attach to a ruling sustaining a demurrer ore tenus, or admitting or rejecting testimony, and the like. * * * It must be held that the order denying defendant’s motion for judgment is not appealable, and hence the appeal therefrom must be dismissed." The case under consideration comes squarely within the rule of the Wisconsin cases, and within the language of the statute. It follows that the motion to dismiss the appeal must be granted. So ordered. All concur.




The State of North Dakota ex rel. Marshall C. Goodsill, Plaintiff, v. Thomas J. Woodmansee, Defendant.

1. Constitutional Law—Section 27 of State Bank Act Valid.

Section 27, c. 23, Laws N. Dak. 1890, entitled "An act to provide for the organization and government of state banks," which prohibits all persons from doing a banking business in this state, except corporations which are organized under said chapter, examined and held to be constitutional. Said section does not contravene either § 1 of arti-