by exercising any separate one of the various banking functions as by exercising all” See, also, the following authorities: People v. Barton, 6 Cow. 290; People v. Insurance Co., 15 Johns. 358; People v. Brewster. 4 Wend. 498; Pennington v. Townsend, 7 Wend. 276; Hallett v. Harrower, 33 Barb. 537; Nance v. Hemphill, 1 Ala. 551; Austin v. Sfate, 10 Mo. 591. It is clear from these citations that the matter of regulating and prohibiting private banking, and all banking not expressly authorized by law, is strictly within the legislative discretion, under that branch of the police power relating to the public safety, and that the courts will not interfere and declare such legislation unconstitutional as an evasion of individual rights.
The relator further contends that said § 27 is unconstitutional for the reason that it violates the provisions of § 61 of the state constitution, which reads as follows: “No bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; but a bill which violates this provision shall be invalidated thereby only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.” Relator’s contention is that § 27, in prohibiting and punishing private banking, does not relate to the subject-matter of the act as expressed in its title, There is absolutely nothing in this point. The subject of the law, as expressed in the title, is “State Banks;” but that subject includes and comprehends not only state banks, but all other banking in the state which is related to state banking. In creating state banks, and providing for their government, the law makes the business of banking a corporate franchise; and to prohibit and punish all other banking is, in our opinion, strictly auxiliary to that subject-matter. Similar constitutional provisions may be found in most, if not all, of the states, some of the states using the word “object” instead of “subject,” as it appears in our constitution. This provision is intended to forestall what Judge Cooley denominates “log-rolling” legislation, and prevent legislation not fully understood by members of the legislature, as well as to prevent all surprises or misapprehensions on the part of the public. But it has been uniformly held that such provisions should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction, and that no matter should be held to invalidate a
