Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 1).pdf/28

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4
NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS.

administrator, a citizen of this state, although appointed and acting here. He is a citizen of Minnesota, and this is the decisive test. The authorities are unanimous on this point Amory v. Amory, 95 U. S. 186; Davies v. Lathrop, 12 Fed. Rep. 358; Rice v. Houston, 13 Wall. 66; Knapp v. Railroad Co. 20 Wall. 117. Nor can it be said that the citizenship of the next of kin of the decedent, and not the citizenship of the administrator, is the test. Although an executor, administrator, trustee, or receiver sues in a representative capacity, yet his citizenship, irrespective of that of the beneficiaries, determines the question of jurisdiction. Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172: Gray v. Davis, 1 Woods, 420; Knapp v. Railroad Co., 20 Wall, 117; Rice v. Houston, 13 Wall. 66. The cases of Browne v. Strode, 5 Cranch, 303; McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 10; and Williams v. Ritchey, 3 Dill. 406, were all cases where the party whose citizenship was held not to be decisive was only a formal party plaintiff. Distinguishing the first two of these cases from a case like the one at bar, the United States supreme court, in Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172, said: “The nominal plaintiffs in those cases were not trustees, and held nothing for the use or benefit of the real parties in interest. They could not, as is said in McNutt v. Bland, supra, prevent the institution or prosecution of the actions, or exercise any control over them.”

It is immaterial whether the appellant is in.a position to raise this question of jurisdiction. This court will reverse a judgment shown by the record to be void, although the point is not raised at all. Robinson v. Navigation Co., 114 N. Y. 315, 19 N. E. Rep. 625.

The language of the enabling act providing for the transfer of cases is different from that of the statute regulating the removal of cases, but the effect of the two statutes is the same. The intent of each is to divest one court of jurisdiction, and confer such jurisdiction on another court, under certain circumstances. The operation of such a statute cannot be be made to depend upon the volition of the tribunal from which the case is to be taken. Such a construction would make the statute self-destructive. When a request for a transfer is made,