ther held that the object of these statutes was to obtain jurisdiction of the person of the defendant; that the bond which the defendant was authorized by these statutes to execute to secure the release of his property was essentially an instrument of bail, which accomplished substantially all the ends that were accomplished at common law by the taking of thé bail-bond below, filing, entering, and perfection of bail to the action above; that, when a defendant in an action of attachment executed such a bond, he did nothing more than a defendant did in England, in an ordinary action, when he first executed a bail-bond below to the sheriff, and subsequently appeared, as he had covenanted to do, and entered into a recognizance of special bail to the action above, and perfected appearance there by the justification of his bail; that the bail-bond below to the sheriff, and the recognizance of special bail to the action above, did not have the effect, at common law, of cutting off any of the defenses to the defendant; and that, therefore, the execution of the bond by the defendant for the purpose of discharging the attachment, under the statutes referred to, did not impair any of the defendant’s rights of defense, and that, after its execution, he might defend the action either by plea in abatement, interposed in apt time and in due form, or by a plea in bar, in the same manner in every respect as if he had not executed the bond, and has suffered the property attached to remain in the hands of the sheriff. Childress v. Fowler, supra. But the Code has made radical changes in the pleading and practice in the courts of this state. The bond and affidavit made by the plaintiff to secure an attachment and the writ of attachment no longer form a part of the original proceedings by which an action at law may be commenced. Under the Code, attachment is a provisional remedy, and merely ancillary to the action in which it is sued out. Its object, as expressly defined by the Code, is to secure the satisfaction of such judgment as may be recovered by the plaintiff. The bond the defendant is authorized to give to dissolve the attachment no longer fills the place of a bail-bond at common law. It does not bind him to appear and answer to the plaintiff's demand at such time and place as by law he should, as it did under the former statutes.
