Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 1).pdf/333

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
BUDGE v. CITY OF GRAND FORKS.
309

in which the courts have held the giving of the undertaking no destruction of the right to traverse the attachment affidavit, it has never been insisted nor intimated that the writ was void because the affidavit was false. The condition of the discharge bond as fixed by the statute indicates the legislative intent that the bond shall not be affected by the dissolution of the attachment, or by any other contingency than the failure of plaintiff to obtain judgment in the action. That condition is to pay the amount of the judgment that may be recovered against the defendant. The promise is absolute, because upon it the writ itself is discharged. The order of the district court is affirmed. All concur.




William Budge, Appellant, v. The City of Grand Forks, Respondent.

1. Taxation—Action by Purchaser of Void Certificate to Recover Against City.

Plaintiff's assignor purchased certain real estate at tax-sale thereof for non-payment of an assessment for street improvement made by the authorities of the defendant city. The city had jurisdiction to make the assessment and sell the assessed property for non-payment, but, by reason of irregularities in the proceedings leading up to the sale, the tax-sale certificates issued by the city treasurer to the purchaser were subsequently decreed to be invalid. Held, that the tax-sale purchaser bought under the rule of caveat emptor, and, in the absence of a statute authorizing it, had no right of action against the city for the purchase money paid for such invalid tax-sale certificates, and the rule is none the less-applicable because the sale was made for the exclusive benefit of the city defendant.

2. Same; Same; Effect of Recitals in Certificate.

Held, further, that the recital in such certificate that the purchaser would be entitled to a deed at a specified time was of no force as a covenant for a deed, and added nothing to the force of the statutory provision to same effect.

3. Same—Reassessment.

Held, also, that a subsequent statute, authorizing municipalities to reassess for street improvements where a former assessment was for any cause invalid, as to all property upon which such former assess-