3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322—a brakeman and conductor of different trains; Van Wickle v. Railway Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 278—a track repairer and an engineer; McMasters v. Railroad Co., (Miss.) 4 South. Rep. 59—brakeman of one train and employe on another; Naylor v. Railroad Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 801—engineer and switch-man; Van Avery v. Railroad Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 40—engineers of different trains; Connelley v. Railroad Co., (Minn.) 35 N. W. Rep. 582—a sectionman and an engineer or brakeman; Howard v. Railroad Co., 26 Fed. Rep. 837—an engineer and fireman of different trains; Railroad Co. v. Rider, 62 Tex. 267; Gormley v. Railroad Co.,72 Ind. 31; Collins v. Railroad Co., 30 Minn. 31, 14 N. W. Rep. 60; Clifford v. Railroad Co., 141 Mass. 564, 6 N. E. Rep. 751; Keyes v. Railroad Co., (Pa) 3 Atl. Rep. 15; Whaalan v. Railroad Co.,8 Ohio St. 249—in each case an engineer and a sectionman. Without stating the relation of the injured to the negligent servant in each of the following cases, they are referred to as being in the same line: Holden v. Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 268; Valtez v. Railroad Co., 85 Ill. 500; Besel v. Railroad Co., 70 N. Y. 171; Brown v. Railroad Co., (Cal.) 7 Pac. Rep. 447; Roberts v. Railroad Co., 33 Minn. 218, 22 N-W. Rep. 389; Brown v. Railroad Co., 31 Minn. 553, 18 N. W. Rep. 834; Cooper v. Railroad Co., 23 Wis. 668; Heine v. Railroad Co., 58 Wis. 525, 17 N. W. Rep. 420; Capper v. Railroad Co., 103 Ind. 305, 2 N. E. Rep. 749; Henry v. Railroad Co., 81 N. Y. 373; Blake v. Railroad Co., 70 Me. 60; Harvey v. Railroad Co., 88 N. Y. 481. The list might be greatly enlarged.
Going back to the fountain, we find this idea of exertion of influence by the injured servant as the basis of the servant rule distinctly repudiated. In the Farwell case, 4 Metc. (Mass. ) 60, Chief Justice Shaw says: “It was strongly pressed in the argument that although this might be so where two or more servants are employed in the same department of duty, where each can exert some influence on the conduct of the other, and thus to some extent provide for his security, yet that it could not apply where two or more are employed in different departments of duty at a distance from each other, and where one can in no degree influence or control the conduct of the other. But we think this is founded upon a supposed distinction on which
