the statute, the district courts of the late territory and of the now state of North Dakota, excluding. the cases enumerated in the statute, have authority to discharge all their functions, not only at a general or special term, but equally, and to the same extent, when there is, strictly speaking, no term. We think the case, 91 U. S. supra, not in point. The district court had ample jurisdiction to allow and sign the bill when that act was done.
But the bill in this case was not settled within the time granted by the court; and respondent’s counsel contends that the act of signing and allowing it was, for that reason, without authority, and void. The cases cited in support of this proposition from California, Kansas, Iowa, and Nebraska fully sustain the contention so far as those states are concerned; but we find, upon examination, that the statutes of the states above mentioned which regulate the allowance and settlement of bills of exception differ radically from our own laws upon that subject. It will be found that, in all the states referred to, the language of the statute, either in express terms or obvious implication, inhibits the settlement of bills and statements after the time limited by law or granted for that purpose has expired. On the other hand, our statute, as amended in 1887, (§ 5093, Comp. Laws,) expressly permits any of the acts connected with the settlement of bills and statements, and giving notice of intention to move for a new trial, to be done after the time has elapsed, and within the time granted after the original period has expired. This amendment inaugurated a departure from the California practice, which had largely prevailed in the territory prior to the adoption of the amendment. We think it was the purpose of the act of 1887 to place the whole matter of settling bills and statements for a new trial, and giving the notice of intention, within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court as to the time within which the several steps in the process may be taken after the statutory limit has been passed. In this view of the statute, the entire process leading up to and including a motion for a new trial, after the statutory limit has expired, and before the time of appeal has elapsed, is a matter of sound discretion with the district courts, and hence cannot be properly
