with the constitution of 1870. Relator also cites on this point State v. Tonks, (R. I.) 5 Atl. Rep. 636. The opinion is short and unsatisfactory. The court hold that the prohibition amendment in that state repealed the prior license law. We have no means at hand of knowing in what respects, if any, that amendment and the prior laws differ from article 20 of our constitution and our prior laws, but assume that they are practically identical. The question of the self-executing character of the amendment was not presented to or considered by the court. The thirteenth amendment to the federal constitution, prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude, provided that congress should enact laws for its enforcement, but was nevertheless held self-executing, at least in part; and that must be true, because, immediately upon adoption of that amendment, any person held in violation of its terms had all the legal means of redress that he would have in case of any other unlawful restraint of his liberty. All the legal machinery was at hand. Mr. Cooley, speaking on this same point, well says: "And, while courts shall be in existence competent to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and to administer common-law remedies, it seems difficult to imagine a case of attempt at a violation or evasion of this declaration of universal liberty that shall be wanting in appropriate redress." Cooley, Const. Law, 221. But it was feared that in some portion of our land it might be necessary to reinforce the common-law remedies by penalties to be inflicted for any violation of the principles of that amendment, and congress was authorized to provide therefor, and no such penalties could be inflicted until congress took the contemplated action.
We recognize the well-settled principle that when, by constitutional provisions, any personal or private right is granted to the citizen, such right is placed beyond the reach of legislative interference, the bill of rights of all the state constitutions furnishing numerous examples of this class; and the reason is plain. The common-law is the ever ready and efficient means of enforcing private rights and redressing private wrongs. But we are considering in this case a constitutional provision that confers no affirmative rights, but, on the contrary, restricts the right of a citizen, and is strictly prohibitory in its nature;
