been wanting on the part of the master. It is true that, had the delivery been thus prevented not merely temporarily, but for all time, the fact that this result had been brought about by the operation of the elements beyond man’s control would have furnished no excuse for a failure to comply with an unconditional engagement to make delivery at the place specified; and, had there been an absolute promise to lay down these stores at Ft. Buford by a certain date, the carrier must have been without redress, though the unexpected freezing of the river had rendered delivery by that date impossible without the slightest fault on his part. But no time of delivery was prescribed by the contract of the parties. The law allows a reasonable time under all the circumstances. Comp. Laws, § 3572. The freezing of the river did not exonerate the master from the contract duty of making delivery at Ft. Buford, but, being without fault, it did release him from the obligation to deliver the goods by the same time which would have witnessed their unlading at Ft. Buford had the navigation of the river remained unobstructed. See Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend, 216. It cannot be possible that a consignor who places no restrictions as to time upon the transportation of his property has the right under the law to insist that a voyage commenced on the verge of winter shall be completed before navigation closes when this is impossible, no negligence of the carrier concurring to cause delay. The reasonable time in which the delivery may be made must be gauged by the exigencies of the case. To lie for months by a wharf, with clear channel from vessel’s prow to point of unlading, would be indefensible. But, when caught in the ice without fault, to lie for as many months in the inexorable embrace of nature, brings no blame to man, for human laws recognize man’s impotence before the might of natural laws and forces. It is true that the master was at liberty to forward the freight by other means. 1 Pars. Shipp. & Adm. 233, and cases cited. This he was given no opportunity todo. It is also true that he might without legal fault have waited until the opening of navigation in the spring to resume his voyage and transport the freight to its destination in the bottom in which it was originally shipped. It was, of course, his duty in the meantime to protect the prop-
