courts of the United States, it was competent for congress to legislate touching the transfer of their records, and of the proceedings pending therein at the time of admission. Said Chief Justice Taney, in Hunt v. Palao, 4 How. 589: "The territorial court of appeals was a court of the United States, and the control over its records therefore belongs to the general government and not to the state authorities; and it rests with congress to declare to what tribunal these records and proceedings shall be transferred," etc. If, as seems to be asserted in Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235, the assent of North Dakota to the transfer of such jurisdiction was necessary, that assent was clearly manifested by accepting statehood under the enabling act, which provided for such transfer. See, also, § 1 of schedule to constitution. We hold that the state court had jurisdiction of the case and power to render the judgment. Defendants further assail the judgment so far as the intervenors are given rights therein. The intervention was without objection, so far as the defendants are concerned. They never answered the complaint in intervention, and we cannot see what possible prejudice has resulted or can result to them from the clause in the judgment directing that a portion of the recovery be paid to the intervenors. It in no manner increases the liability of the defendants. It merely diverts a portion of the recovery from plaintiff to the intervenors. This is a matter between him and them exclusively. See Speyer v. Ihmels, 21 Cal. 281-284, where the court say: "The objection that the judgment should not have directed the money in the sheriff's hands to be paid to the intervenors pro rata cannot avail the appellant, because it is a matter in which he is not interested; and those who are interested in it have not appealed." We have with great labor studied the record of about 500 pages, and the numerous errors assigned, without finding reversible error, and the judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed. All concur.
