the former cases, the victim, the accused, the witnesses, and all connected with the trial, were residents here, and well known to the people of the county; in this case, the defendant, and most of the witnesses, and the deceased, are strangers to us all. Yet this investigation is of as much moment, to the people of this county, as though this crime were directed against one of our own citizens.” To these remarks the defendant's counsel excepted.
To the point that such remarks were improper, counsel for plaintiff in error cited: State v. Williams, 18 N. W. 682; Cleveland Paper Co. v. Bangs, 16 N. W. 833; Brown v. Swineford, 28 Am. Rep. 582; McDonald v. People, 18 N. E. 817; Hall v. Wolf, 16 N. W. 710; People v. Montague, 39 id. 588; Sasse v. State, 32 id. 849. Counsel for the state, contra, cited: Thompson on Trials, §§ 964, 977; Heyl v. State, 109 Ind. 589; People v. Gibbs, 38 N. W. 257; Boldt v. State, 35 id. 935; State v. Calhoun, 34 id. 194; State v. Winter, 34 id. 476; People v. Greenwall, 22 N. E. 180; Anarchists' Case, 12 id. 993.
Wallin, J. The defendant (plaintiff in error) was convicted of the crime of murdering one Casey, and is now incarcerated at Bismarck under sentence of imprisonment for life. On April 24, 1889, motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled by the district court. A bill of exceptions, embracing the evidence and the proceedings had at the trial, was settled in the court below; and the whole record is now before this court for review.
The errors assigned are numerous, and we will first consider those which relate to the formation of the trial jury. The mode of impaneling the jury was the following: Names were called by the clerk; and, as jurors appeared, one at a time, they were sworn individually to try the case, and without calling twelve men into the jury-box. After the panel had been completed, it was sworn collectively, by administering the same form of oath as that which had previously been administered to the jurors individually. We find no warrant in the statute governing criminal trials for swearing the jury collectively, but no exception appears to have been taken to the second swearing of the jury, and we are unable to see how such an irregularity did or could preju-
