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or ambiguity in their meaning. Comp. Laws, N. D., § 4731; Farrel Foundry v. Dart, 22 Conn. 376; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324; Doan v. Phillips, 12 Pick. 223; Fitzpatrick v. Gebhart, 7 Kan. 36. Statutes must be construed in pari materia. Converse v. U. S., 21 How. 463; State v. Garthwaite, 23 N. J. Law 143; Maniel v. Maniel, 13 Ohio St. 458; Bruce v. Schuyler, 94 Ill. 221; Isham v. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Vt. 230; People v. Jackson, 30 Cal. 427; Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vt. 479. The specification of particulars in an instrument or statute is an exclusion of generals. Potter's Dwarris on Stat. 674; Story on Constitution 448; Watkins v. Wassail, 20 Ark. 410; Sweckard v. Bailey, 3 Kan. 507. If § 11 of this act is in conflict with the constitution, then the entire act will fall. The general test rule is that where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, the remainder will not be adjudged void unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, dependent upon each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one without the other. Slossen v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398; State v. Donsman, 28 Wis. 531; Slinger v. Hinneman, 38 Wis. 504; Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555; State v. Tuttle, 53 Wis. 45; In Re Devancine, 31 How. Pr. 343; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553. But to reject § 11 of this act would be a subjection of building and loan associations to the operation of a law which the legislature desired expressly to except from the usury penalties; would thwart the express legislative intent. Cooley's Const. Lim. 214; Rygate v. Wadsboro, 30 Vt. 746; Carnpan v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 266; Myers v. Berlandi, 39 "Minn. 447; Emlie v. Caroline, 9 Wheat. 381; People v. Dana, 22 Cal. 11; Simmons v. Powers, 28 Vt. 354; Tyman v. Walker, 33 Cal. 634; Brown v. Wright, 15 N. J. Law 240; State v. Sauk County, 22 N. W. Rep. 573. The entire act is void. The exception of building and loan associations from the terms of this statute is as obnoxious to the restraint put upon special legislation by the constitution as would have been a special act of the legislature authorizing the taking by them of any rate of interest. Clark v. State, 14 At. Rep. 582: Utse v. Hyat, 9 S. E. Rep. 338; State v. Melica, 17 At. Rep. 941; Board v. Buck, 7 At.