persons who should have examined it before it comes to him. But he is bound to know that omissions of such care are possible, and are dangerous if they occur. And he is also bound to know, as all men know, that it is impossible for employes to completely guard against it." It would be contrary to sound policy to suffer the master to exonerate himself from liability in all cases, even by agreement with the servant. But there are defects resulting from the careless performance of the master's duties, so patent that it is very reasonable for the master to charge an employe with the duty of discovering such defects at his peril. Even in the absence of any regulation, the servant is often held accountable for his failure to guard against such defects. In this case the regulation but augmented this obligation. It called the servant's attention to the fact that the very difficulty which occasioned the injury sometimes existed. It notified him that the coupling aparatus of cars and engines were not uniform in size; this embraces differences in length. It apprised him of the danger of the work; enjoined upon him the duty of examining so as to know the kind and condition of the draw-heads, draw-bars, links, and coupling aparatus; prohibited him from placing in the train any car with a defective coupling; and, that the rule might be faithfully obeyed by the servant, it explicitly granted to him ample time to observe its behests. The language is unmistakable: "Sufficient time is allowed, and may be taken by employes in all cases, to make the examination required." It was insisted at the bar of this court that this rule was not ordained in good faith; that it was never expected that an employe would observe it; and that any servant who took sufficient time to follow and obey its requrements must inevitably look for discharge. On what principle this court is asked to attribute a Machiavellian policy to the defendant, we are at a loss to determine; and, should we find that only grasping self-interest, without one touch of humanity, was the motive for this rule, still we must adjudge that its grant of sufficient time to make the examination enjoined was written in good faith, when the rule receives, as we believe it was the purpose of the defendant that it should receive, a reasonable construction. In the light of such an interpretation of it, it is
