It is further urged that the risk of his being injured as he was injured was assumed by plaintiff when he entered the employ of defendant. It is beyond legal controversy that the employe, when he enters upon the service, assumes the ordinary risks incident to such service, and also the extraordinary risks of which he has notice, or of which, in the usual exercise of his faculties, he ought to have notice. It is equally well settled that an employe, upon entering the service of a railway company. has the right to assume that the railway and its appurtenances are so constructed as to render him safe in the performance of his duties, and that he will not needlessly be exposed to any extraordinary risk of which he has no notice. Railroad Co. v. Irwin, 37 Kan. 701, 16 Pac. Rep. 146; Railroad Co. v. Rowan, 104 Ind. 88, 3 N. E. Rep. 627; Railroad Co. v. Orman, 49 Tex. 342; Railroad Co. v. Swett, 45 Ill. 197; Railroad Co. v. Russell, 91 Ill. 298. Nor does he assume the risk arising from the erection of a high switch stand and signal so near the track that, at best, it clears the cars but a few inches, particularly when he knows the rules of the company forbid the erection of any such structure in such position. Pidcock v. Railroad Co., 5 Utah 612, 19 Pac. Rep. 191; Scanlon v. Railroad Co., 147 Mass. 484, 18 N. E. Rep. 209; Boss v. Railroad Co., 5 Dak. 308, 40 N. W. Rep. 590. Nor can we say that plaintiff, in the ordinary exercise of his faculties, was bound to know the condition of that switch stand. It is true that he had passed it upon this train nearly every day for two weeks; but he had no duty to perform in connection with the running of the train-nothing in any manner that would be likely to call his attention to the condition of this switch stand. Under such circumstances it would be only natural that he should pass it without notice. We do not see why he should be charged with knowledge of its condition simply because he had passed it, any more than any passenger who had passed it an equal number of times. Railroad Co. v. Irwin, supra, and Pidcock v. Railroad Co., supra. It is undisputed that plaintiff had no actual knowledge of the existence of this danger. Had he seen it, duty and self-preservation alike would have required him to avoid it, if possible. Had he known of its existence, or had he been chargeable with such
