sumed that it was called at his office. To allow the return to have any effect as against the record and the presumptions arising from it would be to authorize issues of fact as to what did or did not occur.” The evil that would result in cases of this character from holding that the record imports verity is far less than the evil that would result from permitting court records to be frittered away by the memory of man. Nor do we think the petitioner was without remedy in this case; but that question, while important, is not controlling. It often happens that a party is without remedy except against the offending official. It was well said in Cassidy v. Millerick: “The question is not whether the defendant had a remedy, but was he entitled to the one he sought in this writ?” For the reasons above stated the district court is directed to reverse its judgment, and quash the supplemental writ and the return “thereto. All concur.
Coruiss, C. J. I concur on the ground that the record of the case showed that the judgment was entered at the proper time and place, and that this record connot be overthrown by the parol return. There can be no stronger presumption that an officer will make a false record than that he will make a false return. The issue between the record and the return cannot be litigated; and as one or the other must prevail, it is consonant with sound principle to give verity to the record.
The First National Bank, of Fargo, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Matilda M. Roserts and Tuomas W. Hanson and George E. Osgood, Co-Partners as Hanson & Osgood, Defendants and Respondents.
Payment—Application—Notice—Pleading—Weight of Evidence.
1. Evidence held sufficient to sustain verdict of payment.
2. Allegation of payment in answer upon information and belief held sufficient.
3. It is not necessary that a debtor should direct application of payment at the precise time the money is paid. A direction some time
