fundamental law were penalties, to be prescribed by the legis- lature. Every one, therefore, was informed by the title that that law, among other things, would prescribe penalties for the manufacture, sale, and keeping for sale of liquor as a beverage,
such conduct having already been declared unlawful by the .
organic law; and no one was deceived because the act in terms reiterated the prohibition of the constitution, nor was any force added to that prohibition by the prohibition of the statute. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. All concur.
John L. Grandin and William J. Grandin, Plaintiffs and
Respondents, v. E. G. LaBar, Defendant and Appellant.
Appointment of Receiver—Notice—Ex parte Application.
1. In an action in equity to quiet title to real estate, and enjoin the defendant, who resided upon and cultivated the land as a farm, pending the action and permanently, from tilling the land in question, the complaint was verified only on information and belief, and by one of plaintiff's attorneys, A verified answer was served, denying the facts and equities set out in the complaint. After the service of the answer, and before a trial was had, the plaintiffs, without notice to defendant or his counsel, applied to the district court for an order appointing a receiver of the crops planted by the defendant and growing upon the land. An ex parte order was made appointing such receiver, The application was based upon an affidavit setting out, among other things, defendant's insolvency, and that the crops were “liable to be mortgaged,” but no attempt was made to support the original equities set out in the complaint. Held, that such appointment was error.
2 Where, in such cases, plaintiffs’ original equities are denied by answer, and are without support from evidence extrinsic to the complaint, a receiver should not be appointed, even after notice and a hearing; much less should the defendant be dispossessed summarily by ex parte proceedings.
3. The practice of appointing receivers ex parte is not tolerated by the courts except in cases of the gravest emergency, and to prevent irreparable injury.
(Opinion Filed Oct. 30, 1891.)
