the widow should continue to possess and occupy the homestead with the children during her entire life, if she so elect, and upon her death the children may continue so to possess and occupy the homestead until the youngest child becomes of age, so that at no time, until the youngest child reaches the period when the law declares him able to care for himself, shall this family be without a home, or—in case the homestead be a farm—without the means of obtaining a livelihood. But this occupancy, either of the surviving widow or children, would be terminated by. any disposition of the homestead according to law, as hereinbefore indicated. In view of the facts of this case we deem it proper to add that the statutes will be searched in vain for any intimation that the widow's rights as survivor are affected in any manner by the absence of issue or by the fact of a second marriage. This last point is directly ruled in Nicholas y. Purczell, supra. To the point made by appellant that a homestead interest cannot attach to property owned in common, we reply that such is the case only where the common ownership is prior in point of time to the initiation of the homestead right. In this case the homestead right existed before descent cast. It existed in the life-time of the decedent, and he was powerless to destroy it. The subsequent ownership in common of the fee cannot affect the prior right. The judgment of the district court is in all things affirmed. All concur.
