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prevents any further accession to the class, it is apparent that the classification stands, not upon a reasonable ground based on difference in population, but is purely arbitrary. The act might as well have expressly named the particular objects included, to the exclusion of all others. So far as this particular provision of the constitution against special legislation is concerned, it is immaterial that the act is general inform. The question is always as to its effect. Any other doctrine would render nugatory the prohibition of the fundamental law against special legislation. Under the guise of statutes, general in terms, special legislation, in effect, could be adopted with no inconvenience, and the evil to be extirpated would flourish unchecked. Statutes general in terms have been adjudged void as special legislation because they could operate only upon a part of a class. The authorities are explicit upon this question: People v. Railroad Co., 83 Cal. 393, 23 Pac. Rep. 303; Investment Co. v. School Dist. 21 Fed. Rep. 151; Miller v. Kister, 68 Cal. 142, 8 Pac. Rep. 813; Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 33 N. W. Rep. 800; Com. v. Patton. 88 Pa. St. 258: Devine v. Commissioners, 84 Ill. 592; State v. Michell, 31 Ohio St. 607. Said the court in Nichols v. Walter: "These cases cited from many on the subject are sufficient to show that, in determing whether a law is general or special, courts will look not to its form or phraseology merely, but to its substance and necessary operation.” In Com. v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258, an act general in form, bué so worded that it could apply to only one county in the state, was before the court. It characterized this attempted evasion as “classification run mad.” In State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St., 98, 1 N. E. Rep. 439, the court say, at page 103, 43 Ohio St. and page 448,1N.E. Rep.: “It is not the form the statute is made to assume, but its operation and effect which is to determine its constitutionality.” It is no answer to the contention that an act is special legislation, to insist that only a single class is excluded. The exclusion of a single person or object which should be affected by a statute is fatal. All must be included or the law is not general. If one may be omitted, where shall this linte be drawn? Here authority is in accord with principle. Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. St. 885; Bray v. Hudson Co., 50 N. J.