in § 69, and this section embraces all laws locating or changing county seats. The second answer is that the question whether a general law can be made applicable is purely a legislative question, and the decision of the law-making power in this respect is subject to no review. Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426,21 N. E. Rep. 267; Wiley v. Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152,12 N. E. Rep. 165; Brown v. City of Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 Pac. Rep. 455; People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489, 22 Pac. Rep. 851; Richman v. Supervisors, 77 Iowa 513, 42 N. W. Rep. 422; Owners of Land y. People, 113 II]. 296; State v. County Court, 50 Mo. 317; McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St. 247; State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178.
There is much force in the position that the act in question is alaw of general nature, within the meaning of § 11 of article 1 of the constitution, providing that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation. Trust Co. v. Whithed, 2 N. D. 82, 49 N. W. Rep. 318; People v. Railroad Co., 43 Cal. 398-432. But see State v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St. 275, 20 N. E. Rep. 335. That the law is not uniform in its operation, within the meaning of the constitution, naturally follows from the arbitrary nature of the classification it attempts to make. See cases cited in Trust Co. v. Whithed, 2 N. D. 82, 49 N. W. Rep. 318-320. The judgment and order of the district court are reversed, and that court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs upon the demurrer for the relief demanded in the complaint. All concur.
Ole J. Moe, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant and Respondent.
Settling Bill of Exceptions—Extention of Time—Review on Appeal—Mistake in Law.
1. Section 5093, Comp. Laws N. D., construed. Held, that the authority conferred by said section to extend time and settle bills of exception and statements after the statutory periods for so doing have expired is not an absolute, non-reviewable discretion, but, on the contrary, such discretion is a sound judicial discretion, and can be exercised only upon the conditions named in the statute—i.e., “upon good
