his part at that hour or stage in the execution of the contract The party thus forbidden cannot afterwards go on, and thereby increase the damages, and then recover such damages of the other party.” It is to be noted that in the case at bar the refusal to perform was not premature. The contract specified no time when performance thereof should be entered upon by the plaintiffs, but it provided that the building, with all its equipments, must be finished within 100 days after the amount had been subscribed. The plaintiffs might, under these provisions, have entered upon the performance of their part of the agreement at once. It was the right of the appellant to notify them immediately of his determination not to carry out his part of the contract, in order to save himself from the increased damage which a partial performance before notice might cause. Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 533, is confidently relied on by respondents. The language used in this and similar cases must be construed in the light of the facts. In the case in 114 Mass. an action for damages was brought before the defendant was under any obligation to perform the contract, the action being based upon defendant’s premature refusal to carry out the contract. The decision merely was that the action was prematurely brought; that the defendent might before the time for performance arrived, change his mind, and insist on a performance of the contract. The case does not decide that when one party to a contract may, under its terms, enter upon the performance of it, the other party may not, subject always to liability for damages, prevent the completion of the contract, or prevent the commencement of work thereunder, for the purpose of subjecting him to liability for the full contract price. If respondents’ contention is sound, it was beyond the power of the appellant ever to escape the payment of the contract price, although he had been tke only party to the contract on his side. He could not break it so as to subject himself to damages and prevent the respondents from completing the creamery and holding him for the contract price until the same had been fully completed and ready for delivery, for only then, it is said, was the appellant bound to do any act on his part under the contract; and when the creamery was finished it was claimed that appellant would not
