breach, refrained from carrying out the agreement on their part. On what principle does this assertion stand? The general rule is, as we have already stated, that the contracting party who has certain things to do under his contract, has no right to proceed: with the execution of the contract, and charge the other party with the expense thereof, after he has been notified that such other party will not stand by his compact There is no reason why the rule should not apply in the case of a refusal to perform, emanating from one or two. The parties on the same side of a contract are bound together in interest, and there is no reason why all of ‘the rest should not be responsible for the default of any one. The nature of the engagement is that the contracting party will continue bound to perform only on condition that they all continue faithful to their compact, and not on condition of only a portion standing by their engagement. Whether defendant may be liable to his co-contractors for breach of an implied agreement to keep his promise we need not now decide.
It is urged that the decision in Buchel v. Lott (Tex. App.), 15 8. W. Rep. 413, is in point. We cannot see the faintest resemblance between that case and the one at bar. The appellant, with others, had signed a subscription list, aggregating $23,000. The amount subscribed was to be a bonus to be paid’ on the construction of a line of railway within a specified time. The railroad was so constructed, and in an action against the appellant to recover the amount of his subscription, the court held him liable on the theory that the consideration for his promise was executed; the promise of each subscriber being such a consideration for the promise of the others as rendered absolute the obligation to pay the aniount of the subscription, and that, therefore, appellant could not withdraw his subscription. In the class of cases of which this is one the doctrine is recognized that the liability is as absolute as though each subscriber had received as a loan the amount which he agrees to pay as a subscription. There is an obligation to pay the money, which is indefeasible by any act of the subscriber. Said the court in this case: ‘He became bound upon said contract the moment he signed it for the amount subscribed by him, sub-
