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by congress to said company within the limits prescribed by its charter,” includes lands within place and indemnity limits. Railroad Co. v. U. 8., 36 Fed. Rep. 282. This language is inconsistent with any idea save that of a grant of quantity. Were the grant of specific sections with a mere right to select indemnity for such portions thereof as had been previously appropriated, there could not be a deficiency at the time of the final location of the road of the “amount of the lands granted per mile.” The “amount of the lands granted” would be simply the amount of lands remaining undisposed of within the place limits at the date of fixing the definite location of the road, since the grant is in terms of such unappropriated lands only. The “amount of lands per mile” is obviously the amount of twenty sections per mile on each side of the line, subject to deficiencies arising from their non-existence, or having been previously granted to aid in the construction of another railroad, having its line on the same general route. The description of this amount as “granted by congress” is plainly expressive of the intent of that body. This resolution and the original act are in pari materia, and, though enacted at different times, are to be treated prospectively, and construed together, as though they constituted a single act. Suth. St. Const. § 283; Converse v. U. S., 21 How. 463; Railroad Co. v. Barden, 46 Fed. Rep. 602. It is a matter of public notoriety and general history that at the time this resolution was passed the railroad company had not fixed the general or definite route of any portion of its line. It had done nothing. It appears in many of the public documents printed for public distribution by the government that no portion of the general route even was fixed prior to August, 1870. Referring to the amendment to this act made by the act approved July 15, 1870, the supreme court says, in the case of Railroad Co. v. Traill Co., 115 U. S. 600, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201, that the power to amend in that instance was exercised “before the company had built a mile of road, or earned an acre of land, or in any other manner secured an equitable right to the lands.” And, although this fact does not appear in the pleadings, we think the court can fairly take judicial notice thereof. Bybee v. Railroad Co., 26 Fed. Rep. 588, 139 U. S. 674, 11 Sup. Ct.