Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/451

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YEATMAN v. KING ET AL.
425

assault—barriers seemingly of adamant, and apparently standing upon abiding foundations—would crumble before the breath of legislative definition. We are confident the agent has no power to define away the limitations upon his delegated authority. Said Mr. Justice MILLER in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97: “But when, in the year of grace 1886, there is placed in the constitution of the United States a declaration that ‘no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,’ can a state make anything due process of law which by its own legislation it choses to declare such? To affirm this is to hold that the prohibition of the state is of no avail, or has no application, where the invasion of private rights is affected under the form of state legislation.” In the Munn Case, 94 U. S. 113, the language of Mr. Justice FIELD is equally emphatic. Speaking of the provision in the constitution of Illinois declaring certain grain elevators public warehouses, he said: “There is no magic in the language, though used by a constitutional convention, which can change a private business into a public one, or alter the character of the building in which the business is transacted.” Chief Justice Watrr, in the same case, after reaching the conclusion that the business of the warehouseman at Chicago, under the peculiar circumstances, was affected with a public interest—was a public business—said: “It may not be made so by the operation of the constitution of Illinois or this statute, but it is by the facts.” It is needless to dwell longer upon a principle so obvious.

Is, then, the obligation under the law resting upon the person who has received temporary county aid in the shape of seed grain, to repay to the county the value thereof, a tax in any sense of the word whatever? We are very clear that it is not. If the oracle be consulted we find it gives back no answer that will justify the theory that this obligation isa tax. Says Judge Cooley at the very threshold of his work on Taxation: "Taxes are defined as being the enforced proportional contribution of persons and property, levied by authority of the state for the support of the government and for all public needs.” The amount to be paid by him who has been supplied by the