Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/480

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454
NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS.

resort in which this rule is any longer disputed.” Id §99. In the note to Wright v. Railroad Co.,2 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas, 121, cited by appellant, the doctrine is recognized that “the fact that a person is a trespasser on the track does not absolve the company from preventing inflicting an injury upon him, if by the exercise of due care it could be avoided. * * * What is due care on the part of the company, under such circumstances, is necessarily a question of fact, and depends upon the circumstances of each case.” Citing Railroad Co. v. Riley, 47 Ill. 514; Stout v. Railroad Co., 2 Dill. 294; Railroad Co. v. Dignan, 56 Ill. 487; Finlayson v. Railroad Co., 1 Dill. 579. Without extending this opinion by further quotations, we cite, in addition to cases already mentioned, and as supporting some or all of the propositions which we announce, the following cases: Railroad Co. v. Todd, 36 Ill. 409; Railroad Co. v. Champ, 75 Til. 577; Railroad Co. v. Godfrey, 71 Ill. 500; Palmer v. Railroad Co., 37 Minn. 223, 33 N. W. Rep. 707; Locke v. Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 350 (Gil. 283;) Witherell v. Railtoad Co., 24 Minn. 410; Scheffler v. Railroad Co., 32 Minn. 518,12 N. W. Rep. 711; Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 52 Ark. 162, 12 S. W. Rep. 329; Harlan v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 480, 65 Mo. 22; Hicks v. Railroad Co. 64 Mo. 430; Isabel v. Railroad Co., 60 Mo. 480; McCarty v. Canal Co.,17 Hun. 74; Harty v. Railroad Co., 42 N. Y. 472; Kerwhacker v. Railroad Co., 3 Ohio St. 172; Railroad Co. v. Lawrence, 13 Ohio St. 67; Washington v. Railroad Co., 17 W. Va. 190; Lawson v. Railroad Co., 57 Iowa 672; Trow v. Railroad Co., 24 Vt. 494; Laude v. Railroad Co., 33 Wis. 640; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 14 Kan. 469; Railroad Co. v. Davis, 31 Kan. 645, 3 Pac. Rep. 301. Section 3603, Comp. Laws, reads as follows: ‘Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases is defined by the title on compensatory relief.” We fully agree with appellant that this does not abrogate the common-law rule as to contributory negligence. It but declares and confirms that rule as recognized