ent case from the one under the statute of New York in question, for in this instance the rate of charges is fixed directly by the legislature. See Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 921. What was said in the opinion of the court in 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, had reference only to the case then before the court, and to charges fixed by a commission appointed under an act of the legislature, under a constitution of the state which provided that all corporations, being common carriers, should be bound to carry ‘on equal and reasonable terms;’ and under a statute which provided ‘that all charges made by a common carrier for the transportation of passengers or property should be equal and reasonable.’ What was said in the opinion in 134 U. 8. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, as to the question of the reasonableness of the rate of charge being one for judicial investigation, had no reference to a case where the rates are prescribed directly by the legislature. Not only was that the case in the statute of Illinois, in Munn v. People, but the doctrine was laid down by the court in Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. People, 118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4, that it was the right of a state to establish limitations upon the power of railroad companies to fix the price at which they would carry passengers and freight, and that the question was of the same character as that involved in fixing the charges to be made by persons engaged in the warehousing business. So, too, in Dow vy. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1028, it was said that it was in the power of the legislsture to declare what should be a reasonable compensation for the services of persons exercising a public employment, or to fix a maximum beyond which any charge made would be unreasonable.”
The federal supreme court, without deciding whether it would under any circumstances assume to determine whether or not a maximum rate fixed by the legislature of a state was unreasonable, declared, referring to the New York cases, what may be said with equal truth and propriety of the case we are considering, viz: “The records do not show that the charges fixed are unreasonable.” Nor do we feel called upon to anticipate what our conclusions might be in a case where it is made to appear that a rate of compensation prescribed by statute is so inade-
