no such offense as burglary complicated and mixed with another felony. It describes simple burglary only. Hence, under our practice, burglary cannot, more than any other offense, be united in the same indictment with another offense. If, in addition to burglary, another offense has been committed, it must be made the foundation of a separate indictment.” This reasoning is applicable to our statutes defining “burglary.” Here the crime is never complicated with another offense. Another offense may and usually does accompany it; but no other offense can, under our statute, enter into its constitution as a component part thereof. The breaking and entering with the criminal intent constitutes the crime. Whatever is done subsequently adds nothing to it, but will, if criminal in its character, constitute a separate offense. Comp. Laws, §§ 6736-6742.
In Farris v. Com. (Ky.), 14 S. W. Rep. 681, the statute perpetuated this crime of burglary when complicated with another offense. It in substance declared the offense to be burglary, not only when there was a breaking and entering with felonious intent, but also when some other felony was committed in connection with such breaking and entering. Under such a statute, to charge the stealing, as well as the breaking and entering, is only to charge a constituent element of the crime, not necessarily a part of the crime, as either the intent or the consummation of the deed intended will, under such a statute, in connection with the breaking and entering, make up the crime of burglary, but still as much an element as the criminal intent itself. The actual stealing was in this case a part of the one crime of burglary, and so made a part by statute. To set it forth in the indictment was therefore proper. The language of the opinion conclusively shows that this construction, which we have given the decision in this case, that it was proper to charge the stealing as well as the breaking and entering, is correct. Said the court: ‘Where the breaking with intent to steal is shown, the offense is complete; but the legislature saw fit to add to the statute, ‘or shall feloniously take therefrom,’ not as establishing the breaking, but as showing the felonious intent. The statutory offense is the breaking with the intent to steal, or the breaking followed by a stealing, which evinces the felonious in-
