ment curing such defect, and not by motion for judgment on the answer as frivolous.
(Opinion filed July 18, 1891.)
APPEAL from district court, Cass county; Hon. WILLIAM B. MCCONNELL, Judge.
J. E. Robinson and Taylor Crum, for appellant. Stone, Newman & Resser for respondent.
Action for cancellation of tax deed, to quiet title to certain realty in plaintiff and for possession of the same. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.
Mr. Crum presented the case for the appellant in an exhaustive oral argument, but cited no authorities in his brief.
Stone, Newman & Resser for respondent:
Appellant could not, pending the litigation between respondent and the Hadleys, in which he acted as attorney for them, acquire any interest in the premises in question antagonistic to the Hadleys by the purchase of an outstanding tax title. Such purchase is wholly void and the question may be raised by respondent. Lynn v. Morse, 39 N. W. Bep. 203; Greenhood on Public Policy, p. 437; Rogers v. Marshall, 13 Fed. Rep. 59; Henry v. Raiman, 25 Pa. St. 354; Lindsey v. Sinclair, 24 Mich. 380. If not wholly void appellant would take in trust, and such purchase would inure to the benefit of the Hadleys, and any interest thereby acquired would pass co instanti and vest in respondent by operation of law, and this could not be prevented or such interest divested by any act or consent of the Hadleys. Stockton v. Ford, 11 How. 232; Moore v. Bracken, 27 Ill. 22; McDowell v. Milroy, 69 Ill. 498; Reichhoff v. Brecht, 2 N. W. Rep. 522. Equity would treat appellant as trustee for respondent in the purchase in question. His act was the act of the Hadleys, Black on Tax Titles, § 138; Cooley on Taxation, p. 345-6; Blackwell on Tax Titles, *399; Frye v. Bank, 11 Ill. 367; Douglas v. Dangerield, 10 Ohio, 152. Such a transaction is always presumptively fraudulent and void and the burden of proof is on appellant, and it is sufficient for respondent to allege
