Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 3).pdf/145

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GOULD v. DULUTH AND DAKOTA ELEV. CO.
105

practice, although such signing is not as likely to occur as it was during the territorial regime, when the judges were often called outside of their district to sit in banc as a Supreme Court. Such an order, when made ex parte by a judge would, under the terminology used in the earliar statutes, be denominated a “chambers order,” and the act of 1887, § 4828, Comp. Laws expressly allows such orders to be made at any place within the territory, in any matter properly before him.” See, also § 5324, Id. We think those provisions of the statute are not repugnant to any provision of the state constitution, and therefor are now in force. Under the terms of the statute the Judge of the Third Judicial District, where the action was pending, would have been authorized to direct the entry of judgment at any place within the state. Whether the Judge of the Fifth District, who actually made the order, had authority to make the same, depends upon whether such judge, when he signed the order, was lawfully empowered to discharge the official duties of the Judge of the Third District. We think the Judge of the Fifth District was legally empowered to make the order. The state legislature has, in terms, given authority to the District Judges, under the circumstances stated in the statute, i. e. where a District Judge is unable to act “for any reason,” or is technically “disqualified,” to request another of the District Judges either to hold a term of court, or to hear a motion or try a case or cases for the judge so unable to act, or so disqualified. The judge requested to act, when so called in, becomes empowered, under the statute, to “do and perform all such acts as might have been done and performed by the Judge of said District.” Laws 1890, p.176. The wording of this statute is so unfortunate that the meaning of some of its features is rendered obscure and dubious, but the general purposes of the act cannot be mistaken. The statute is stricily remedial in character, and should therefore receive a liberal interpretation, with a view of accomplishing the main purpose of the enactment, which clearly was to give a judge who was either technically disqualified or unable to act, “for any reason,” to call in an outside judge, either