rendered in that action against the defendant therein (the plaintiff in this case) for the full amount of the note. The defendant in the present action was not a party to that suit; but waiving this point, whatever force it may have, we are clear that the trial court did not err in holding the defense insufficient. The record of the case before the justice of the peace is set forth in the answer. It appears from that record that the plaintiff therein alleged that it purchased the note, and that the same was indorsed to it by the payee before maturity for a valuable consideration and in good faith. This averment was denied. But we are unable to say that the court did not find this fact in favor of the plaintiff. Such a finding would, of course, preclude all inquiry into the questions of the breach of warranty and rescission. Even though the justice had been convinced of the truth of the defense in this regard, he must have given judgment for plaintiff because of his being a bona fide purchaser before maturity. It thus appears, upon the face of the answer in the case at bar, that the former judgment may have rested on either of these points,—that there was no breach of warranty and rescission, or that the defendant therein could not, despite such breach of warranty and rescission, sustain his defense, because the plaintiff therein was a good faith purchaser and indorsee of the note before maturity. The defendant in the case at bar should have shown, by additional allegations in his answer, that the issue as to the breach of the warranty and rescission was in fact found against the defendant in that case, the plaintiff herein. When the record does not settle the question, oral evidence is admissable to show what was in fact decided; but the answer must clearly show the ultimate fact, as-to what was decided. If that fact is left in doubt by the answer the defense fails. The case we have to decide falls within that class of cases where a judgment on one cause of action is sought to be used as conclusive in a suit on another cause of action. In such cases the judgment is final only as to the matters which were in fact determined in the former case and adjudicated by the judgment. Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105, and cases cited; Stone v. Stamping Co., Mass. 29
