Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 3).pdf/51

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DOTY v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LARIMORE.
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books of the respondent bank, but, so far as shown by said books, Wolcott continued to be the absolute owner thereof, until after the attachment hereafter mentioned was levied. On July 5th, 1888, an action was commenced by D. B. Doty & Co. against said Wolcott and others in the District Court of Grand Forks County. The action was aided by attachment, and on July 19th, 1888, the sheriff of said county duly levied upon said shares of stock by serving the proper notice upon the cashier of the respondent bank. At the time of such levy the stock stood upon the books of the bank in the name of said Wolcott, and neither the plaintiff in the attachment action nor the officer making the levy had any knowledge of the assignment to Bowne. The certificates of stock provided that the stock should be transferable only on the books of the bank upon the surrender of the certificates. Subsequently D. B. Doty & Co. recovered judgment in the attachment action, execution was issued, and the sheriff of said county, under such execution, sold the shares of stock upon which the attachment had been laid to Edmund S. Doty, the appellant herein, and executed the usual sheriff's certificate of sale therefor. Immediately thereafter appellant presented to the respondent bank a duplicate copy of such certificate, together with a written demand that such stock be transferred to him upon the books of the bank, and stock certificates issued to him therefor. This the bank refused to do or to permit to be done; whereupon this action was brought to recover from the bank the value of such shares of stock. But one question of law is urged for our determination, and it is this: Under the facts disclosed, could appellant, under and by virtue of said sheriff's sale, acquire any right or title to the shares of stock of a national bank superior to the title and rights of Bowne under the assignment and delivery? If so, then the respondent bank improperly refused to make the transfer, and is liable for the value. Sargent v. Insurance Co., 8 Pick, 90; Bond v. Iron Co., 99 Mass. 505; Shipley v. Bank, 10 Johns, 484; Freon v. Carriage Co, 42 Ohio St. 30. If not, the refusal was justified, and no liability attaches. Sections 5003, 5005, Comp. Laws, make property in this