354
NOTES AND QUERIES. [ii s. xi. MAY s. IQI&
3. It did not change its direction Craan
has misled Houssaye. The French bat-
talion that attacked Halkett's left was
not the leading column, as Houssaye would
have us believe, but was a battalion which
had drawn to its right from the rear of the
leading French column which attacked
Maitland. It escaped hostile fire by march-
ing in the low ground lying to the immediate
east of the projecting tongue of ground,
the south part of which is still visible near
the Lion mound. It encountered no oppo-
sition at all not even Brunswickers. No
artillery played upon it, and it ascended the
English position before the eyes of the
30th and 73rd regiments in as correct order
as at a review. No skirmishers preceded it,
as I suppose would have been the case if it
had been the leading battalion. It rose step
by step directly in front of Halkett's left,
crossed the ridge, and then fired a volley
at the 30th and 73rd, who advanced to
meet it.
4. Halkett's left did not give way. So far from its giving way, it was the French battalion that gave way, thanks to Van der Smissen's merciless shower of grape at very close quarters. This is an instance of Hous- saye's curious way of dealing with evidence. The following is what actually took place, as described by an English officer who was present and took part in the charge, and who would not have been in later days (see Major Macready, United Service Journal, 1845) so zealous a champion of Halkett's left, if it really had given way. After the French battalion had halted and fired a volley, Lieut. Macready, as he then was, says :
" We returned it, and giving our Hurrah ! brought down our bayonets. Our surprise was inexpressible when, pushing through the clearing smoke, we saw the backs of the Imperial Grenadiers. We halted and stared at each other. Some nine-pounders from the rear of our right poured in the grape among them, and the slaughter was dreadful. I never could account for their flight. It was a most providential panic. We could not pursue on account of their cavalry."
Not much giving way about that not, at any rate, on the part of Halkett's left ! I will quote another officer who was present, and was engaged in the charge, Lieut. Rogers of the 30th :
" We fired, cheered, and came to the charge. Just at the time when I supposed we were closing with them (for we were on the ground they had stood on) I was thunderstruck to hear our men damning their eyes for not waiting till they had had their revenge for what the artillery had done."
Houssaye has here mixed up two different
events. Halkett's left did, in fact, get into-
great confusion, but not owing to their
being driven back by the French Guard..
When this battalion of the Guard fled, it
was followed up by the 30th and 73rd, who
thereupon found themselves on the highest
part of the ridge. There they were very
much exposed, and on the French artillery
pouring a terrific fire upon them, they were
promptly ordered to retire down the hill
for shelter. Shot, shell, and grape came
like a hurricane through the square, and
the men increased their pace down the slope.
While they were so retiring, they were
rushed into and turned into a mob by the
men of the 33rd and 69th Regiments," who-
were also seeking shelter from the destructive
fire of another battalion of the French
Guard. Fifty cuirassiers would have cut
the whole brigade to pieces. Luckily, they
were not further attacked, and with Major
Dawson Kelly's assistance all four regiments
were quickly reformed and again advanced
to the front line.
5. This is quite correct. Van der Smissen's guns (six-pounders, not nine -pounders) came up in the very nick of time. It was a cruel- surprise to the enemy. The grape shot from this Dutch battery cut regular lanes into the French column, which turned and fled, but fled in good order, having fired only once. This feeble attack was plainly very different from the tremendous attack directed against Maitland's Guards a little- further to the English right, and which the gallant Ney was leading sword in hand. The assault on Maitland preceded, and did not (as Houssaye would have us believe)* succeed, the attack on Halkett.
6. This is altogether erroneous, yet several recent authors have adopted it from Hous- saye. Ditmer's troops never at this time charged any of the French Guard. It is well known, wrote General Sir James Shaw Kennedy, that the Dutch -Belgian troops,, from political and other causes, but not from any want of courage, were not to be depended on. It was generally thought that if they had to fight, they would rather have fought for Napoleon than against him. Ditmer's brigade included a great number of raw, untrained militiamen, who did not seem to have much stomach for the fight,, and were reluctant to advance to the first line. Lord Teignmouth, in his * Reminis- cences,' tells us that his relative Lieut. -Col.. Sir T. Noel Hill, who acted as A.D.C. to Lord Hill, was sent to General Chasse to- order his troops to advance, " when the>
