righteouſneſs, and is withdrawing from the miniſtry thoſe temporal rewards, which proceeding from an approbation of their perſonal conduct, are an additional incitement to earneſt and unremitting labors for the inſtruction of mankind; that our civil rights have no dependance on our religious opinions, more than our opinions, in phyſics or geometry; that therefore the proſcribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of being called to offices of truſt and emolument, unleſs he profeſs or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriouſly of thoſe privileges and advantages to which in common with his fellow citizens he has a natural right; that it tends alſo to corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to encourage, by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honors and emoluments, thoſe who will externally profeſs and conform to it; that though indeed theſe are criminal who do not withſtand ſuch temptation, yet neither are thoſe innocent who lay the bait in their way; that to ſuffer the civil magiſtrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to reſtrain the profeſſion or propagation of principles, on ſuppoſition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, which at once deſtroys all religious liberty, becauſe he being of courſe judge of that tendency, will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and approve or condemn the ſentiments of others only as they ſhall ſquare with or differ from his own; that it is time enough for the rightful purpoſes of civil government, for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts againſt peace and good order; and
