Page:Novoa v. Diaz.pdf/126

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Case 4:22-cv-00324-MW-MAF Document 44 Filed 11/17/22 Page 126 of 139

constitutionally protected conduct.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114. Overbroad laws violate the First Amendment because they punish “a ‘substantial’ amount of protected free speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19 (2003) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).

Here, the Novoa Plaintiffs argue that the IFA “lacks any legitimate purpose” and, thus, “is always overbroad in relation to its legitimate sweep.” ECF No. 19 at 43, in Case No.: 4:22cv324-MW/MAF. This Court agrees that the challenged provisions lack any legitimate sweep. As articulated above, the challenged provisions of the IFA unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment and are impermissibly vague in violation of the Fourteenth. Thus, under either analysis, the challenged provisions of the IFA have no legitimate sweep. And the very concept of overbreadth presupposes that there is some legitimate sweep. So, because the challenged provisions have no legitimate sweep, the overbreadth doctrine does not apply. Thus, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits for their overbreadth claim, given the challenged provisions’ lack of legitimate sweep against which to judge any alleged overbreadth. This is simply the wrong vehicle by which to challenge the statute.

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