Page:Novoa v. Diaz.pdf/128

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

Case 4:22-cv-00324-MW-MAF Document 44 Filed 11/17/22 Page 128 of 139

interests.” First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). Plus, the portions of the FEEA that the IFA did not amend remain in effect to protect Floridians from discrimination in education.

In sum, because Plaintiffs have carried their burden as to all four of the preliminary injunction factors, this Court finds that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction.

B

Having determined the merits of Plaintiffs’ motions, this Court must now decide the scope of relief to which they are entitled. Here, Plaintiffs present their case as a facial challenge to the IFA and implementing regulation. Although a party’s characterization of their challenge as facial or as-applied is not determinative, Jacobs v. Fla. Bar, 50 F.3d 901, 905 n.17 (11th Cir. 1995), this Court agrees that Plaintiffs bring facial challenges in both their First Amendment viewpoint discrimination and Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claims.

“A facial challenge is an attack on a statute itself as opposed to a particular application.” City of L.A. v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 415 (2015). Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims are facial challenges because they attack the validity of the IFA and Regulation 10.005, rather than any particular application of the IFA or Regulation 10.005. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 211–218, in Case No: 4:22cv304-MW/MAF; ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 271–285, in Case No: 4:22cv324-MW/MAF. The same is true with

128