present, therefore if A is contingent to no B, but B is present with a certain C, A is not contingent to a certain C, but it was supposed contingent to every C, and it may be shown after the same manner, if the negative be added to C. Again, let the affirmative proposition be necessary, but the other negative and contingent, and let A be contingent to no B, but necessarily present with every C; now when the terms are thus, there will be no syllogism, for it may happen that B is necessarily not present with C. Let A be "white," B "man," C "a swan;" "whiteness," then, is necessarily present with "a swan," but is contingent to no "man," and "man" is necessarily present with no "swan;" therefore that there will be no syllogism of the contingent is palpable, for what is necessary is not contingent. Yet neither will there be a syllogism of the necessary, for the latter is either inferred from two necessary premises, or from a negative (necessary premise); besides, from these data it follows that B may be present with C, for there is nothing to prevent C from being under B, and A from being contingent to every B, and necessarily present with C, as if C is "awake," B "animal," and A "motion;" for "motion" is necessarily present with whatever is "awake," but contingent to every "animal," and every thing which is "awake" is "an animal." Hence it appears that neither the non-inesse is inferred, since if the terms are thus the inesse is necessary, nor when the enunciations are opposite, so that there will be no syllogism. There
