Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/114

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

which are oppositely divided; for the remainder will be the property of that of which it is stated not to be the property; thus, since it is the property of prudence to be naturally per se, the virtue of the reasoning part, and of each of the other virtues thus assumed, the property of prudence would be, to be naturally per se, the virtue of the appetitive part of the soul.

Chapter 7

In the next place, from cases, subverting property indeed if case is not the property of case, for neither will one case be the property of the other; thus, since what is beautifully is not the property of what is justly, the beautiful would not be the property of the just. On the other hand, confirming if case is the property of case, for the one case will be the property of the other; thus, since pedestrian biped is the property of man (in the nominative case), it would also be the property of man to be called pedestrian biped (in the dative case). Not only however must we observe cases in respect of what has been stated, but also in opposites, as was observed in the former places, subverting indeed if the case of the opposite is not the property of the case of the opposite, for neither will the case of one opposite be the property of the case of another opposite; thus, since what is well (done) is not the property of what is justly done), neither would be ill (done), the property of that which is done unjustly. Again, we confirm it, if the case of the opposite be the property of the case of the opposite, for the case of this opposite will be the property of the case of that opposite; thus, since best is the property of good, worst would be the property of evil.

Next, from those which subsist similarly, subverting, indeed, if what subsists similarly is not the property of what has similar subsistence, for neither will what subsists similarly be the property of that which has similar subsistence. Thus, since the builder of a house subsists similarly with regard to building a house, as the physician with regard to producing health, but it is not the property of the physician to produce health, neither would it be the property of the house-builder to produce a house.