firm it, if what is similarly property is the property of this of which it is similarly the property; for what is similarly property will be the property of this thing of which it is similarly the property. For instance, since what is primarily prudent is similarly the property of the reasoning part, and what is primarily temperate of the appetitive part, but what is primarily prudent is the property of the reasoning, the primarily temperate would be the property of the appetitive part.
Secondly, we subvert it, if what is similarly the property (of a thing) is not its property, since neither will what is similarly property be the property of it. Thus, since it is similarly the property of man to see and to hear, but to see is not the property of man, neither would the property of man be to hear. Again, we conlirm it, if what is similarly the property (of a thing) is its property, for what is similarly its property will be the property; thus, since it is similarly the property of the soul that a part of it should be appetitive primarily and argumentative, but it is the property of the soul that a part of it is primarily appetitive, it would be the property of the soul that a part of it is primarily argumentative.
Thirdly, it is subverted, if it is not the property of what it is similarly the property, since neither will it be the property of what it is similarly the property, but if it is the property of that, it will not be the property of the other. Thus, since to burn is similarly the property of flame and of a burning coal, but it is not the property of flame to burn, neither would it be the property of a burning coal to burn, but if it is the property of flame, it would not be the property of a burning coal: this place however is of no use to him who confirms.
Nevertheless, (the place) from things similarly affected, differs from that from things similarly inherent, because the one is assumed according to analogy, and is not considered in respect of something being
