Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/25

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is evident, as it is necesary from what we have said, either that the multitude should be at variance with the wise about the thesis, or one or other of these with themselves, since a thesis is a certain paradoxical judgment. Now almost all dialectical problems are called theses, let it, however, make no difference how they are called, as we have not thus divided them from a desire to fabricate names, but that we may not be ignorant what are their real differences.

Still we need not consider every problem nor every thesis, but that which any one may be in doubt about, who is in want of argument and not of punishment or sense, for those who doubt whether we ought to worship the gods and to love our parents or not, require punishment, but those (who doubt) whether snow is white or not, (need) sense. Nor (need we discuss those things) of which the demonstration is at hand, nor those of which it is very remote, for the one do not admit of doubt, but the other, of greater (doubt) than accords to (dialectic) exercise.

Chapter 12

These things then being determined, we must distinguish how many species of dialectic arguments there are. Now one is induction, but the other syllogism, and what indeed syllogism is, has been declared before, but induction is a progression from singulars to universals, as if the pilot skilled in his art is the best, so also is the charioteer, and generally the skilful is the most excellent about each thing. Nevertheless, induction is more calculated to persuade, is clearer, and according to sense more known, and common to many things; but syllogism is more cogent, and efficacious against opponents in disputation.