troops the King of Naples could bring against him, though they had all the advantages of preparation, of position, of artillery. It is idle to say that the Bourbonists had no stomach for the work in hand. Though, individually, each soldier who fought under Bosco may have cared very little for Francis II. or his throne, each one cared very much that there should be no “solution of continuity” in the region of his own throat. What they may have been before, and what after, the battle matters but little. Whilst it was raging the Bourbonist soldiers had to look to their own lives. All that they could do to beat the Garibaldians they did, and all was in vain. Fifty guns—100,000 rounds of ammunition—the evacuation of the fortress of Melazzo—the possession of the town of Messina, were the immediate and not very contemptible fruits of the victory won by the great Guerilla Chief. He must be an awkward opponent at a military chess-board, for he sees, at a glance, all the results which may be derived from the derangement of a single pawn. The blunder once committed, it is irretrievable, for the next moment the deluge is upon you. The battle of Melazzo was not the result of a preconceived plan, although no doubt Garibaldi had his plan for the reduction of Messina. He was quiet at Palermo when he heard by telegraph of the inconclusive fighting between Medici and Bosco. In a moment his resolution was taken. The enemy had given him the chance, and a few hours sufficed to conceive, mature, and carry out his attack. He ordered a re-inforcement of 1200 men to embark with him on board the City of Aberdeen, and with morning’s dawn had accomplished the little voyage along the coast, and was present on the spot where the decisive blow was to be struck. His mere presence seems to exercise a magnetic influence upon his men. He infuses a portion of his own spirit into every soldier who fights under his orders. Who would turn back in the presence of such a leader as that? In the annals of warfare you will scarcely read of a more bloody and hopeless advance than that of the small party of Genoese Riflemen who were ordered by Garibaldi to clear the cane-thickets of the enemy. They could not see the enemy, and were seen themselves. They were shot down without the power of returning a shot themselves. Man by man they passed on in single file, whilst the thickets were glowing with the fire of the foe. At last the work was done—but of the little company who entered the cane-wood, scarcely half returned to tell the story of the struggle. It is with regret we read of Garibaldi’s personal encounter with the enemy, for how much hangs at the present moment upon his single life! Were a stray bullet to strike that noble heart Italy would fall back again into the crucible of diplomacy, and ten years would not suffice to accomplish the results which he will achieve in as many weeks. Garibaldi is a man of a single idea—and that idea is, that without looking to the right or left, and without calculation of remote consequences, Italy must be purged of her foreign and native oppressors. It is an error to give this gallant soldier credit for a kind of subtlety and forethought which are foreign to his character. As sure as he lives, so surely will he go from Sicily to Naples—from Naples to Rome—from Rome to Venice in the end, or perish in the attempt. He puts the King of Sardinia’s letter in his pocket, with the simple remark that he, being on the spot, is the best judge of the situation of affairs. The battle of Melazzo is the answer to the Royal letter. The affairs of Sicily once arranged, he will pass over to the mainland and exact from the young king an account of his stewardship—nor can the result be very doubtful. Naples, however, is but the stepping-stone to Rome. General Lamoricière, before the autumn is out, will have to look to his arms, though the presence of the French force in the city of Rome itself is an obstacle which can scarcely be overcome. All persons who have the honour of Garibaldi’s friendship—or even of acquaintance with him—must be well aware that he never loses an opportunity of declaring that in his view the temporal power of the Pope and the priests has been the cause of misery and abasement to Italy for centuries. The Pope and his belongings are—as our own Cromwell would have said—the root of the matter. Garibaldi, moreover, has some recollections of what occurred twelve years ago, or thereabouts, in the neighbourhood of Rome, and no doubt he will be anxious to complete a task which he was then unable to carry through. Can we have any hesitation in saying that the sympathies of England are with him in his work? Even the French Emperor, in his letter of the other day to M. de de Persigny, says that he is anxious to take measures in concert with England for the settlement of the affairs of Southern Italy. Let us hope it is so. Our answer cannot be other than that the sound policy is to leave the Italians to themselves. If the French Emperor will heartily unite with us on this point it would be a great re-assurance to Europe after the unfortunate blunder of Savoy. Meanwhile the “Moniteur,” on Friday last, published the text of the convention signed at Messina between General Clary and Colonel Medici. It is a military convention for the evacuation of Sicily, and purports to be based simply upon motives of humanity. So far it is well; but when we read, under date of August 3rd, from Naples, that the King and his ministers are occupied with the convocation of parliament, and are disposed to grant even more than the constitutionalists ever asked, we cannot but doubt if that parliament will ever meet, according to our own usual phrase, for the despatch of business.
It looks, this time, as though the problem which has been the great enigma of Europe for centuries was upon the eve of solution. The Austrian Emperor declines yet to renounce the style of Lord of Lombardo-Venetia, and his officers declare that before a few months they will be back in Milan. It may be so: but such a result does not look very probable just now. Upon the birthday of Francis Joseph, now just at hand, Austria is about to enter upon the path of constitutional reform—at least it is said so. Louis Napoleon was about to despatch Kossuth during his Lombard campaign to Hungary—even without Kossuth, Hungary will give work enough to the Austrian Cæsar.